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Financial additionalitya b s t r a c t
Effectively mitigating climate change entails a quick upscaling and redirection of electricity infrastructure
investment towards clean power. Given that the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions increases until 2050
will come from low- and middle-income countries, finding cost-effective ways to mitigate climate change
while meeting development targets is essential. However, recent research has shown some of the limita-
tions of broad financing mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and existing car-
bon markets. This has resulted in a growing interest in designing novel investment support schemes, such
as modifications of feed-in tariffs (FiTs) that may be more cost effective and better targeted towards par-
ticular outcomes when compared to traditional deployment subsidies or broad financing mechanisms.
We evaluate the design and outcomes of one such novel support schemes: the GET FiT (Global Energy
Transfer Feed-in Tariff) investment support scheme in Uganda, which has attracted ~ 453 million USD
in private sector investment for 17 small-scale renewable energy projects (solar, hydro, bagasse) in only
three years. Using financial modelling on detailed project-level data, we find that most projects were
additional and would therefore not have been built without the subsidy. In addition, using firm-level
panel data, we show that power outages hamper manufacturing performance in Uganda. In the absence
of reliable outage-data for the entire Ugandan territory, we use nightlight variations to proxy changes in
outages. We show that outages have declined substantially since the introduction of GET FiT. Yet, our
analysis also demonstrates that programmes to incentivise additional renewable generation in develop-
ing countries funded internationally or domestically should liaise closely with grid authorities to ensure
that supply does not outstrip demand.
 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under theCCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
For many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) unreliable and
insufficient power supply poses a substantial challenge to poverty
alleviation and economic development. In the region, 57% of the
population – around 600 million people – do not have access to
electricity and continuous power outages hamper the economic
performance of those already connected to the grid (IEA, 2018).
As in many other countries in SSA, the dual challenges of providing
access to electricity and keeping power supply stable for those con-
nected to the grid is severe in Uganda (Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies,
2019). In addition, as the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions
increases until 2050 will come from low- and middle-income
countries (Dechezleprêtre, Glachant, Johnstone, Ménière, &Haščič, 2011), finding cost-effective ways to mitigate climate
change while meeting development targets is essential. While
SSA features high solar irradiation and wind speeds in many
regions, fossil-fuel based power generation still accounts for a sub-
stantial fraction of total power generation, which emits local land
global pollutants.
Providing access to clean, affordable, and reliable electricity in
the region requires significant increases in power sector invest-
ment, particularly given substantial economic and population
growth (Huenteler, 2014). Using 2005 as a baseline, the World
Bank (2011) estimated that Sub-Saharan Africa needed to add at
least 8 GW between 2005 and 2015 of generation capacity to meet
its growing power demand and electrification targets in line with
poverty reduction goals. Yet, the average over the last decade has
been 1–2 GW (Eberhard, Gratwick, Morella, & Antmann, 2017).
This additional capacity in power generation in excess of the his-
torical trend in SSA was estimated to require financing of roughly
US$ 40 billion p.a., which is equivalent to 38% of the combined
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Africa (Eberhard et al., 2017; World Bank, 2018). The large magni-
tude of the investment needed, combined with the strained finan-
cial situation of the governments in many of those countries,
necessitates a big role for private and/or international finance.
Existing studies underscore that private investments in the
power sector will not materialise without a suitable investment
environment, which involves adequate financial returns, a trans-
parent regulatory environment and other political, socio-
economic and financial factors (Waissbein, Glemarec, Bayrakta, &
Schmid, 2013; Probst, Holcroft et al., 2020; Probst, Anatolitis,
Kontoleon, & Díaz Anadón, 2020). While there are several studies
investigating the factors driving renewable power investment from
the private sector (Bürer & Wüstenhagen, 2009; Surana & Anadon,
2015; Probst, Holcroft et al., 2020; Probst, Anatolitis et al., 2020),
there is a paucity of studies investigating the effectiveness of pub-
lic instruments to crowd in private capital into renewable power in
developing countries (Polzin, Egli, Steffen, & Schmidt, 2019).1 In a
review of existing studies, Lindenberg (2014; p.33) concludes that
‘‘[a] quantitative assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of
public spending that is aimed at mobilising private funds for green
investments in developing countries has not yet been carried out
for the simple reason that data is not available.”
We therefore contribute to filling this gap in the literature by
investigating the design and local economic impacts of one of the
first schemes in developing countries aimed at crowding in private
capital for the construction and operation of renewable power gen-
eration assets: The Global Energy Transfer Feed-in Tariffs (GET FiT).
In 2013 the GET FiT programme was launched with about 104 mil-
lion USD of development funding from the German Development
Bank KfW and other donors. Within three years, it attracted ~453
million USD in private sector investment for 17 medium-sized
renewable electricity projects. To our knowledge, the comprehen-
siveness and transparency of financial data that we received from
the GET FiT programme administration is unmatched in any other
evaluation of a similar type of programme.
Our two central research questions therefore are: First, how has
this novel financing approach – which in contrast to existing
schemes tackles both the risk and return of private investors – per-
formed in crowding in investment from the private sector (i.e.,
financial additionality); and how does it on average compare to
other approaches including pure return-approaches, exemplified
by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and pure risk-
mitigation approaches addressing political risk such as the Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)? As studies on MIGA
are scarce, we will primarily focus on the return-improving pro-
grammes, such as the CDM, where there is a substantial literature.
Another reason why we focus on risk-return approach is that exist-
ing studies from industrialised countries show that tackling both
risk and return concurrently is more effective than merely address-
ing one or the other; yet studies on that for developing countries
are scarce (Polzin et al., 2019). Within the first research question,
we also investigate whether reductions in risk primarily translate
into lower cost for debt and/or equity for renewable energy project
developers.
Second, have the GET FiT funded medium-sized renewable
energy (5–20 MW) plants, distributed geographically across the
country, contributed to improved economic development out-
comes through the provision of more reliable electricity by the1 Van de Sijpe et al. (2019) propose a probabilistic approach to assess whether
development finance institutions’ (DFI) investments are more or less likely to be
additional. As other studies, however, they assess the additionality of DFI investments
and not of private sector investors that are nudged to invest by DFI interventions such
as the GET FiT approach to improve the risk-return profile of renewable energy
investments.
2
reduction in power outages for private households and/or firms?
If so, what is the economic effect in terms of firm productivity
through this channel? Understanding the effect of renewable
power generation on firm performance is important, as arguments
in favour of renewable generation are commonly advanced on
purely cost and environmental grounds. Yet, second-order effects,
such as increased firm performance due to greater grid stability,
are not commonly investigated.
We rely on two methods to study these research questions.
First, applying financial modelling on detailed project-level data,
as well as insights from more than 60 interviews with developers,
investors and government agencies, we estimate the financial
additionality of the programme and the evolution of financing
risks. We analyse financial additionality by modelling the financial
returns of all GET FiT funded projects – hence, both rejected and
accepted by the programme – and then using those that were
rejected, but went ahead even without support, as a counterfactual
(see Section 4 for more detailed explanation). Second, in order to
study the local economic effects and the influence of outages on
firm productivity, we use detailed manufacturing and nightlight
data to study whether the new power plants are reducing outages.
Using financial modelling on detailed project-level data, we find
that the majority of projects that received a subsidy from the GET
FiT programme were additional and would therefore not have been
built without the subsidy. In addition, using firm-level panel data,
we show that power outages hamper manufacturing performance
in Uganda. In the absence of reliable outage-data for the entire
Ugandan territory, we use nightlight variations to proxy changes
in outages. We show that outages have declined substantially since
the introduction of GET FiT. Yet, our analysis also demonstrates
that programmes to incentivise additional renewable generation
in developing countries funded internationally or domestically
should liaise closely with grid authorities to ensure that supply
does not outstrip demand.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
describes the policy context in Sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda,
and outlines different approaches for catalysing private sector
investment in renewable power in developing and emerging
economies. In Section 3 we discuss the GET FiT programme. In Sec-
tion 4 we then move on to discuss our data sources and methodol-
ogy, whereas Section 5 details the results of our analyses regarding
financial additionality and possible productivity gains associated
with the GET FiT programme. Section 6 presents our conclusion
and policy recommendations.2. Overview of different approaches to incentivise private sector
involvement
In order to gauge whether a project is financially viable, inves-
tors rely on several metrics. These include the Net Present Value
(NPV) of projects, which is the discounted difference between the
cost and the revenues generated by a (power) project. The NPV
of a project needs to be positive for an investor to go ahead.
Another metric is the so-called Internal Rate of Return (IRR), which
is the rate of return on capital at which the NPV becomes zero. It is
then compared to the discount rate, or so-called hurdle rate, to
determine whether an investment is desirable. Generally, the
higher the IRR and NPV the more attractive an investment is
(UNFCCC, 2011). As these metrics can be used across investments
of different types, they are good measures for inter-project com-
parison. However, there are risks that investors may not be able
to correctly quantify or to manage (including financing, technol-
ogy, integration, and country/political risks and off-taker risk),
making the projects only feasible at very high financing cost,
2 A range of multilateral development banks have further refined the definition of
financial additionality, by explicitly specifying different types of financial addition-
ality. These refer to 1) financing structure (e.g., financing not available in the market
from commercial source), 2) innovative financing structures and/or instruments (i)
lowering cost of capital or by addressing risk, ii) not available in local markets at
reasonable cost), 3) MDB’s Own Account Equity (Equity that cannot be assessed
through the market) and 4) resource mobilisation (mobilisation of capital from
private sources) (MDB, 2018).
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ity delivered (Kreibiehl & Miltner, 2013).
Policies that aim to increase the participation of private actors
in the power sector can generally use two levers. First, pro-
grammes can increase investors’ return from the project (Fig. 1):
These can include price premiums on existing feed-in tariffs, tax
breaks or the sale of carbon credits (e.g., through certified emis-
sions abatement). Second, programmes can attempt to lower the
risk of developing and operating renewable power projects. These
include financial risks and policy risks. Financial risks can be miti-
gated, for instance, via power purchase agreements, in which a pri-
vate or state-controlled utility agrees to purchase power for a set
number of years (e.g., 20) for a specific price. Instead of relying
on the wholesale market, which reflects the balance of demand
and supply, developers outsource all price risk to the utility pur-
chasing the power. Policy risks are those related to the regulatory
environment. These include the risk that there may be retroactive
changes to the feed-in tariff by the government, which may be per-
ceived as too high.
A significant risk factor in many countries is so-called offtaker
risk. This is particularly true in many SSA countries, such as Kenya
(Pueyo, 2018) and Uganda (Meyer, Eberhard, & Gratwick, 2018),
among others. Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited
(UETCL) is also perceived to be a risky financial offtaker. Therefore,
the Ugandan government has issued sovereign guarantees to
power project developers since 2012 (Meyer et al., 2018). Even if
the government provides guarantees, delayed payments are a
major risk for renewable energy developers, for which other
short-term liquidity supporting approaches can be used (Probst,
Holcroft et al., 2020).
Given substantial economic and political differences between
high and low/middle-income countries, policies that have induced
renewable power development cannot merely be ‘transplanted’
from industrialised countries. While the evidence from the indus-
trialised economies is instructive in devising policy toolkits, there
are many additional challenges in low- and middle-income coun-
tries (Polzin et al., 2019). These include lower institutional capaci-
ties, corruption, lower budgets and political instability. Yet, low-
income countries may benefit from two decades of research and
renewable power buildout, which has decreased the cost through
R&D, learning by doing, economies of scale, and learning in financ-
ing (Egli, Steffen, & Schmidt, 2018; Qiu & Anadon, 2012).
How to best support developing and emerging economies in
their transition to clean energy has been the focus of substantial
debate in academic and policy circles (Huenteler, 2014). This is
particularly relevant as there has still been little agreement on
the specific design of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which
allows countries to coordinate climate change mitigation and
adaptation measures internationally. It will likely contain a market
mechanism to promote the ambitious aims of the Paris Agreement
and avoid many of the pitfalls inherent in the Kyoto Protocol’s
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Yet, as the specific design
of Article 6 has been the source of major contention, it was post-
poned at the COP24 and COP25, and will be negotiated at the
COP26.
Table 1 provides an overview of the name, technology, start,
policy levers and the geographic scope of various schemes that
intend to accelerate private sector investment in clean technolo-
gies in developing countries. We divide the approaches to the
extent that they address two crucial decision metrics of investors
in line with Polzin et al., (2019): investment risk and investment
return (or a combination thereof). Risk is understood as ‘‘[..] the
effect of an unpredictable event on the project value, considering
both the probability of possible events and their financial impact
in the case that they materialise” (Polzin et al., (2019; p.2). With
increasing risk, a higher market premium on top of the a risk free3
rate is expected, which is commonly calculated as the yields of a
US treasury bond with 30 day maturity (Grabowski, Nunes, &
Harrington, 2014). Table 1 it not exhaustive and is meant to pro-
vide an overview of the different policy levers that are used to tar-
get investors’ return and/or risk.
The GET FiT approach can be classified as a combined risk-
return approach, since it tackles both return (through paying the
incremental cost of utilities between the maximum purchase price
and the price determined administratively (FiT) or through auc-
tions) and sources of financial and policy risk (e.g., through capac-
ity building). The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in turn,
can be seen as a return-increasing mechanism and specifically
focuses on improving the return of investors through the direct
sale of carbon credits generated through the process. However,
its main focus was not addressing sources of financial and policy
risk. In contrast, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) primarily safeguards investors against political and non-
commercial risk in developing countries and can therefore be seen
as a risk-mitigation approach (MIGA, 2019).
2.1. Measuring financial and emissions additionality
Irrespective of the type of approach to incentivise private-sector
investment, one critical question is whether it leads to additional
renewable power infrastructure investment. Development agen-
cies and governments want to understand whether their funding
actually leads to projects that would not have happened without
the funding. If the funding was not necessary for the buildout, pol-
icy makers would have merely increased the profit of renewable
energy developers (often at the expense of tax payers). While these
additional revenues may be re-invested into other projects, exist-
ing incentives would have been already sufficient for the project.
In the climate change domain, typically two types of additional-
ity are distinguished (Chan, 2015). First, financial additionality,
which refers to the question whether the project would have been
financially feasible without the funding.2 Financial additionality is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the second type: emissions
additionality. This refers to the question whether the new power
plant actually substitutes more emissions-intensive sources of
power. It could be, for instance, that a new solar PV plant, that would
not have been built without the financial incentive, but merely sub-
stitutes power from another clean-power source, such as small
hydro projects. It therefore would be financially additional but not
emissions additional.
The largest programme in the domain of incentivising the build-
out of renewable power generation in developing countries is the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Schneider, 2009). The
CDM administration used an additionality investment tool, gener-
ally considered a robust approach if performed well and data is
credible. The investment analysis is performed to gauge whether
the investment would have been financially viable without the
additional funding which the project receives through the sale of
carbon credits. However, a major point of concern for this analysis
is that the benchmarks used to establish additionality are often
unreliable and outdated. For instance, in China an 8% IRR bench-
mark was used for CDM projects that was taken from a 2002 report
from the State Power Corporation of China (‘‘Interim Rules on Eco-
nomic Assessment of Electrical Engineering Retrofit Projects”)
Table 1
Overview of different funding schemes to incentivise private-sector investments in green technologies based on author. *Note: MIGA is the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA), which safeguards investors against political and non-commercial risk in developing countries (MIGA, 2019). provides Its projects cover a wide range, so listing is
merely indicative of approach. All mechanisms are still ongoing. GET FiT and Scaling solar are combined risk-return approaches, using both risk and return levers to make
investment in renewable energy in developing countries more enticing. In contrast, MIGA primarily focuses on mitigating risk, whereas the CDM focuses on increasing return. The
list is not exhaustive but is meant to provide an indicatory overview of different approaches.
The dependent variable is log sales in real 2005 UGX. Labour is the log number of employees, capital is the log machinery value of each firm, outages are the hours of outages
per month for a given firm. Generator is the number of hours the generator runs per month, and the interaction between the two continuous variables outages and generator
is how both variables are jointly related to the dependent variable log sales.
Fig. 1. Effect of different policies on risk-reward profile of different renewable energy projects. Infeasible projects are those where the financial return is not sufficient to
justify the investment risk (i.e., risk of losing the investment) based on Polzin et al. (2019) and Waissbein et al. (2013). MIGA refers to Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, CDM to Clean Development Mechanism and GET FiT to the Global Energy Transfer Feed-in Tariff.
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tically integrated utility, but had no empirical justification. Apart
from providing no credible IRR, using a constant IRR as benchmark
ignores changing market conditions, such as lower policy risk due
to a more capable regulator.4
In the largest review of the CDM by the Öko Institut, SEI and
Infra for the DG Climate of the European Commission the authors
draw the following conclusion: ‘‘Overall, our results suggest that
85% of the projects covered in this analysis and 73% of the potential
2013–2020 Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) supply have a low
3 We exclude the solar auction from our analysis, given that the approach to
allocate funding was a reverse-auction and not a fixed top-up. In addition, we only
have limited information on the applicants.
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over-estimated. Only 2% of the projects and 7% of potential CER
supply have a high likelihood of ensuring that emission reductions
are additional and are not over-estimated (Cames, 2016, p.11).”
These results are corroborated by other empirical research, who
find that in the case of China wind projects supported through
the CDM were not any less viable than those outside of the pro-
gramme. These led to emissions reductions certificates equivalent
to the amount of three years of emissions reductions in the Euro-
pean Union Trading Scheme, which were no additional emissions
reductions (Chan and Huenteler, 2015).
Generally, the shortcomings of the CDM to establish credible
additionality in many domains, has led several researchers to sug-
gest that approaches such as the CDM should ideally be used only
in niche areas, where it is evident that no business case exists for
the abatement of certain greenhouse gases (Cames, 2016). For
instance, landfill gas flaring has a high likelihood of providing addi-
tional emissions abatement opportunities as there is no current
business case for doing so otherwise. In contrast, efficient lighting
projects have a low likelihood of being additional, as the transition
away from incandescent lightbulbs is occurring even in the
absence of additional funding through the CDM (Cames, 2016).
Yet, if the investment analysis draws on accurate data and vetted,
time-varying IRR baselines, IRR analysis can give a credible indica-
tion of additionality and is used in this study.
2.2. Measuring the economic impact of reduced outages
As highlighted in the introduction, the installed power genera-
tion capacity for most African countries cannot keep up with eco-
nomic and population growth. Lacking investment in maintaining
the existing grid further complicates this issue. Insufficient gener-
ation capacity and lack of investment in the existing grid leads to
both the quantity and quality of power to be inadequate. In terms
of quantity, the World Bank (2011) estimated that SSA needed to
add at least 8 GW between 2005 and 2015 of generation capacity
to meet its growing power demand and electrification targets in
line with poverty reduction goals. Yet, the average over the last
decade has been 1–2 GW (Eberhard et al., 2017). Similarly, Ugan-
dan firms – and many other countries across the continent – see
unreliable electricity as one of the major impediments to firm pro-
ductivity. Hence, it is clear that outages are a significant impedi-
ment to economic and firm productivity, yet to measure and
quantify the effects is challenging.
The main empirical challenge in understanding the impact of
outages on economic development is that outage data is not com-
monly available. In many developing countries outages are often
monitored by manual record, which is susceptible to recording
errors. Even if digital monitoring systems are in place, these
records are generally not publicly available, given the sensitivity
of the data. In Uganda for instance no outage data is available
and the same holds true for many other developing and emerging
economies.
Given the dearth of outage data, researchers have used variation
in nightlight – captured through satellites passing over a region at
a certain time at night – is that it assumes that a greater variability
of nightlights indicates more outages. This is because places with
few outages will exhibit more stable nightlights, whereas places
with high variability likely experience higher variation.
Several studies have been conducted relying on nightlight data
to study the impact of outages on economic productivity and firm
choices. For instance, Alam (2013) uses nightlight variation in India
to study whether firms change their production processes to cope
with outages. She finds that depending on the coping strategy, an
increase in the frequency of power outages reduces the output
and profit of only a part of the electricity-intensive industry.5
As outage data is commonly not available for many developing
countries, many studies rely on nightlight images from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) This
approach was pioneered by Alam (2013) to gauge the performance
impact of outages on steel manufacturing plants in Indian districts.
However, to our knowledge, there are not studies that have used
this data to study the effect of renewable power generation on
outages, specifically in Africa.3. The GET FiT programme
In 2007, the Ugandan government launched its Renewable
Energy Policy, in which it set a target of 1420 MW (which includes
large hydro) by 2017 (Meyer et al., 2018). This target represented a
more than doubling of existing renewable and thermal generation
capacity. In order to spur investment in clean power through inde-
pendent power producers (IPPs), it introduced a feed-in tariff (FiT)
in 2007. However, the FiT attracted limited interest from project
developers as it was relatively low given the risk profile of the
country. Despite the low attractiveness of the FiT, Uganda still
attracted several IPPs during that time, which entered into direct
negotiation with the government (total 28 MW in small-scale
hydro power).
However, in 2012 it became clear that Uganda needed to
increase the speed and scale of investment in its power gener-
ation infrastructure. It was expected that the country would
run into power supply constraints between 2015 and 2016.
The country would then need to rely on emergency heavy-
fuel oil generators, costing roughly twice as much as the aver-
age power generation cost in Uganda. The GET FiT programme
was therefore launched in 2013 to fast-track the deployment of
157 MW of small renewable power projects throughout four
main application rounds in three technologies (small hydro,
bagasse and solar) with installed capacity between 5 and
20 MW.3 As the FiT had attracted limited investment, the pro-
gramme was expected to accelerate the deployment of renew-
able power generation projects. It has since become evident
that the power supply gap was not as acute as initially believed
due to lower power demand growth between 2013 and 2018
(Meyer et al., 2018). As two major hydropower plants are
expected to come online in 2019–2020, this may put the Ugan-
dan utility purchasing the power into financial difficulties. As the
domestic demand may not be sufficient to absorb these increases
in power generation capacity, the utility may suffer from the
obligation to purchase the power while being unable to fully sell
the purchased power.
The programme was jointly developed by the Government of
Uganda, the Ugandan Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) and
the German Development Bank (KfW) and is supported by a num-
ber of other donors, such as the Governments of Norway, Germany,
UK and the European Union. The GET FiT approach aimed to attract
private sector investment in renewable energy in developing and
emerging economies through the improvement of the existing reg-
ulatory frameworks and, more importantly, through paying the
gap between the maximum price the utility is able to pay and
the price of renewable power. The price of renewable power in
the GET FiT framework is either determined through competitive
auctions (e.g., solar) or administratively set through feed-in tariffs
depending primarily on the type of technology used type (e.g.,
solar is commonly auctioned, whereas power from small-hydro is
supported via FiT).
Fig. 2. Illustration of the GET FiT approach using data from the beginning of the GET FiT project in Uganda based on Kreibiehl and Miltner (2013). LCOE refers to levelised cost
of electricity (LCOE), which is the average net present generation cost of a unit of electricity computed over the entire lifetime of the plant.
Table 2
Overview of GET FiT return and risk levers distinguished by programme component
based on GET FiT (2018).
Overview of GET FiT revenue and risk levers
Programme component Lever Details
GET FiT Premium* Return GET FiT projects reveive 50% of
the feed-in tariff top-up at the
beginning of operations, and the







Risk Law firm supported the relevant
authorities in crafting bankable
documents, which are critical in
receiving funding from banks and
other investors.
World Bank Partial Risk
Guarante Facility
Risk The World Bank earmarked USD
160 million for Partial Risk
Guarantees, including:
- Short-term liquidity for
power offtaker UETCL
- Investor compensation in
case of early termination of
PPA
- Provision of commercial debt
to power developers
Regulator Capacity Building Risk Capacity Building with local
regulator ERA. Components
included power tariff modelling,
due diligence for power plant
licenses and grid interconnection
and wheeling.
Interconnection Risk Additional funds to bolster
existing and build new grid
infrastructure to ascertain power
delivery from GET FiT plants.
*Note: This does not include the solar tenders, which were awarded through a
competitive auction. Here the GET FiT programme pays the incremental cost
between the maximum price the utility can pay and the awarded solar power tariff.
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The GET FiT approach is illustrated in Fig. 2. Consider a firm that
can offer power at around 12 USDc/kWh given the risk-return pro-
file of a specific country (expressed as the levelised cost of electric-
ity, which measures lifetime cost divided by total power
generation). Yet, if current feed-in tariff is substantially below that
(e.g., ~8 c/kWh), it would not allow the firm to recover its cost.
Hence, two levers can be used: First, financial and policy guaran-
tees can be put in place to reduce the risk in the market. Second,
the current FiT can be ‘topped-up’ to increase the revenue that a
firm can make. For instance, in 2012 Uganda had a feed-in tariff
of around 9 USDc/kWh, which attracted little interest from project
developers given that it was too low given regulatory, off-taker and
broader political risks (Meier, Vagliasindi, & Imran, 2014).
The specific levers that the GET FiT programme uses are further
detailed in Table 2. First, it is important to note that renewable
power projects incur most of their cost at the beginning of the pro-
ject. As the project cash flow improves once the power plant goes
into operation, the first years can be very critical, particularly if
projects are delayed. Hence, the GET FiT programme disburses
the entire FiT top-up 50% at start the start of operations and 50%
over the first five years of operation. While this increases the risk
of the programme management in case that power projects do
not deliver on their promise of operating for at least the envisaged
20 years, it reduces the risk for private developers. More precisely,
project developers received an additional 1–2 USDc/kWh on the
existing 9 USDc/kWh feed-in tariff, thereby increasing project
returns. This adds around 20% additional revenues, which is far
beyond the revenues a developer could historically achieve
through selling CDM credits (Chan, 2015). In addition, CDM credits
were subject to volatility and political interference (Cames, 2016).
Second, the GET FiT programme reduced the risk through a
standardised power purchase agreement, which gave project
developers ‘bankable’ documents. This means that these were
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that the power generated would be purchased by the local utility
– or otherwise compensated by the Ugandan government.4 In addi-
tion, the environmental and generation permit process for power
plants was shortened, further reducing risks associated with delays.
In addition, it was initially envisaged by those designing the
GET FiT programme that firms would take out Partial Risk Guaran-
tees (PRG) from the World Bank. These guarantees cover revenue
shortfalls in case the Ugandan utility UETCL, the off-taker of the
electricity, faces liquidity constraints. However, due to the pro-
longed process of getting PRGs and high associated cost, private
firms avoided these guarantees. The interconnection component
is critical, since lacking grid connection may force the off-taker
to buy electricity that it is unable to receive (which means revenue
losses, which will eventually trigger the default).
The GET FiT programme attracted the interest of both existing
local companies within the country (e.g., Hydromax) and interna-
tional companies with limited prior experience in Uganda (e.g.,
Frontier), advertised through conferences, their website and indus-
try networks. Between 2013 and 2015, 17 projects out of 39 appli-
cations in Uganda received a top-up from the GET FiT programme.
The projects are distributed geographically throughout the coun-
try, which provides a major change to the reliance on few big
hydropower plants (see Supplementary Information). Projects
were ranked on their financial, environmental/social and technical
performance by the programme administration.4. Data and methods
The following section provides an overview of the methods
(4.1) and data sources used in our study (4.2).
4.1. Data
We received detailed financial data from KfW German Develop-
ment Bank, which structured the programmewith the Government
of Uganda and strongly supports the programme’s management.
Applicants who seek to be supported by the GET FiT programme
need to hand in extensive documentation regarding the financial,
technical and environmental performance of the proposed
projects.
These project documents are standardised (for instance, all pro-
jects needed to hand it the same audited financial data) and are
therefore comparable across applications. In addition, each project
proposal was further scrutinised by an independent consulting
firm, which vetted the validity of the input assumptions for both
technical and financial parameters through field visits, hydrologi-
cal assessments and detailed financial models. To the best of our
knowledge, the type, quality, and completeness of the information
available on the cost, performance, and financing of each applicant
to the program has not been available for other programs. For
example, for many Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects,
the financial information was commonly relatively sparse, unstan-
dardized and hard to verify (Chan, 2015; Haya & Parekh, 2011;
Michaelowa, 2011; Schneider, 2009).
We also rely on more than 60 interviews conducted between
2015 and 2018 with donors, government officials and IPPs to verify
our assumptions underpinning the estimation strategy, analyse
local capacity building and collect primary data not reflected in4 In addition, the presence of major donors such as KfW and DFID funding the
programme, may have further reduced the risk for developers through developing
standardised power purchase agreements, license procedures and other formal
processes with the Ugandan regulator Energy Regulatory Authority (ERA). In addition
to the guarantees, the above-mentioned FiT top-up is offered that adds around 2
USDc/kWh on the existing 9 USDc/kWh FiT.
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the data provided by KfW. We provide more information on the
types of organisations, interviews and protocol in the Supplemen-
tary information.
Data on the impact of power outages on manufacturing sales is
from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, which collects a represen-
tative firm sample of the formal sector for 139 countries in the
world (World Bank, 2019). This data is widely used across different
studies. Nevertheless, this data has – to our knowledge – not been
used specifically to study the connection between outages and firm
productivity in Uganda (World Bank, 2013). Our sample contains
4315 manufacturing firms from 2006 and 2013. The data was col-
lected using stratified random sampling using information on firm
sector, firm size, and geographic region (World Bank, 2013).6 We
only include firms in the manufacturing sector, as these are the pri-
mary power consumers of the country.
As outage data is commonly not available for many developing
countries, we use nightlight images from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to create our own outage
indicator. To that end, we compiled a dataset with changes in
nightlight activity analysing more than 100 nightlight images
and creating indicators for each of the lowest administrative units
of Uganda. This approach was pioneered by Alam (2013) to gauge
the performance impact of outages on steel manufacturing plants
in Indian districts. However, to our knowledge, this is the first time
this is used to measure outages in Africa and to study the effect of
renewable power generation on outages. As detailed data on the
industrial structure of Uganda is not available, we do not weigh
the outage data by location-specific industry density. However,
most of the industrial output in Uganda comes from major cities
in the Uganda (e.g., its capital Kampala and Jinja) (Shinyekwa,
Kiiza, & Hisali, 2016), for which we provide detailed nightlight
measures over time.4.2. Research questions & methods
We investigate the impact of the programme in two distinct
domains: financial additionality and productivity gains. First, we
study the additionality of the programme by investigating whether
the feed-in tariff top-up in Uganda is associated with additional
power plants that would not have been built without the feed-in
tariff top-up (i.e., financially additional). Second, we investigate
the impacts of outages on firm productivity. Next, we examine
whether lower outages can be attributed to the power plants and
what the effects of more reliable power supply are on firm produc-
tivity. Fig. 3 provides an overview of the distinct research ques-
tions, data, and methods.4.2.1. Financial additionality
An ideal methodological set-up for our first question would
have used a regression discontinuity design to study whether the
top-up resulted in additional power plants that were built. Private
firms needed to apply for the project subsidy and were ranked on
environmental, economic and social criteria. Only projects that
achieved a composite score of 70 out of 100 received the top-
up7. Given that firms were not able to manipulate the cut-off, being
just over or under the cut-off is a matter of luck – i.e., random. This
design feature has been used in different contexts, such as education,5 Our sample size is lower than the actual number in the Enterprise survey data due
to missing values. We show in the Supplementary Information that firms are missing
at random and not systematically.
6 More detailed information on the survey can be found in World Bank (2013)
7 For the solar auctions this was slightly different, because firms were needed to
pass through a two-stage selection process: first on various environmental, social and
technical criteria, and (those that remained) subsequently on price.
Fig. 3. a) Overview of the research questions, b) and the data and methods of our study based on author.
9 We have no data on the reduced cost through better voltage control in the grid, as
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later academic performance; see Imbens and Lemieux (2008)).
However, given that the variability around the cut-off is not suf-
ficient to implement a regression discontinuity design, we improve
the existing CDM investment additionality approach to gauge addi-
tionality in the GET FiT programme. Firms that were rejected by
the programme could still go ahead with the project. Given that
at the point of application firms needed to hand in extensive finan-
cial and technical documentation, firms had already invested sub-
stantially in the project, and therefore had an incentive to go ahead
with the project without applying for a new generation license.8
We use the financial data of these projects that were rejected by
the programme but went ahead anyway to create a counterfactual
‘minimum’ return that was required by project developers in order
to implement the project. We then model the financial returns of
projects that received support from the GET FiT programme to test
whether they would have been financially viable even without the
subsidy. If for instance, the financial return required by project
developers went down over time due to lower risk, then a fixed sub-
sidy likely over-subsidised projects in later rounds. We acknowledge
that to implement our approach researchers need audited and trans-
parent data, which may only be available in certain policy contexts.
We compute the IRR via the following formula:




ð1þ IRRÞn ð1Þ8 For instance, firms needed to conduct environmental impact assessments as well
as water flow measures of small hydro projects.
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where we set the Net Present Value (NPV) equal to zero, which is
equivalent to setting the value of current and future cash flows
across N years (CF) to zero. The IRR is then compared to the com-
pany’s hurdle rate of cost of capital (which is commonly a weighted
average of the cost of debt and equity). In theory, if the IRR is
greater than that hurdle rate, the company would consider going
ahead with the project. In reality, however, there are a number of
other factors (e.g., organisational, other investment opportunities)
that may influence the decision.
4.2.2. Impact of outages on productivity
In order to estimate the induced productivity effects – i.e.,
through fewer outages and more stable electricity supply9 – we
estimate the production function of the manufacturing sector in
Uganda, which consumes the majority of electricity in Uganda. Var-
ious survey studies (World Bank, 2013) and econometric assess-
ments underscore (Alam, 2013; Andersen & Dalgaard, 2013) that
outages have a detrimental effect on productivity, even though
specific assessment for Uganda are still lacking.
Production function are widely used in economics, with its most
widespread functional form being the Cobb-Douglas Production10
function It describes the relation of two or more inputs – primarily,
labour and capital – to the eventual output (i.e., how much input is
needed for a given amount of output?).machines could be damaged if voltage is outside of acceptable boundaries.
10 We tested the specification of the production function against other possible
production functions, such as the translog production function. Yet, goodness of fit,
among other tests, show that the Cobb Douglas function is better fit to our underlying
data.
B. Probst, L. Westermann, Laura Díaz Anadón et al. World Development 140 (2021) 105347We estimate the following production function via a pooled
panel and random effects panel model:
yit ¼ aþ b1lit þ b2kti þ b3elti þ b4Xit þ eit ð2Þ
where i indexes the firm and t the year. Yit in our first specification
is log sales in million Ugandan shillings (UGX – 2005) in year t11, l is
labour (log number of full time employees), k is capital (log value of
machinery in million UGX denominated to 2005) and el refers to two
indicators, namely electricity outages (number of outages per day –
not logged, given zero values) and how many hours per month the
company uses its generator and X is a vector of covariates (geo-
graphic location and industry controls). We rely on the geographic
information contained in the World Bank Enterprise Survey data
(2006, 2013) for Uganda, which relies on six regions, which repre-
sent the bulk of industrial activity in Uganda: Jinja, Kampala, Lira,
Mbale, Mbarara, and Wakiso.
We conduct a Hausmann test, which is commonly used to
decide whether fixed or random effects are more appropriate in a
panel setting (see Supplementary Information). The central differ-
ences between random and fixed effects is that they make different
assumptions about the underlying correlation of unobserved vari-
ables. If unobserved variables are uncorrelated with the explana-
tory variables, then both fixed and random effects are consistent,
but random effects is more efficient than fixed effects (i.e., has
lower standard errors than fixed effects). However, if the assump-
tions is violated – that the explanatory variables and unobserved
variables – are uncorrelated, then only fixed effects is consistent
(but random effects is not). Even though the underlying assump-
tions is likely often wrong, the Hausmann test provides a metric
to decide how far off the assumption is using the estimators and
variance of both fixed and random effects regressions. The Haus-
mann test shows that random effects model is a better fit to our
underlying data.
4.2.3. Nightlights as proxies for outages
The main empirical challenge in understanding the impact of
outages on economic development is that outage data is not com-
monly available. In many developing countries outages are often
monitored by manual record, which is susceptible to errors. Even
if digital monitoring systems are in place, these records are gener-
ally not publicly available, given the sensitivity of the data.
We use the variation of nightlights in Uganda – disaggregated





where O is the outage in sub-country j at time t (unit month). N is
the number of months per year. Standard deviation is the monthly
aggregated standard deviations of pixel i, for sub-country j at time t.
While we cannot directly detect outages this way (either outage
or not), the assumption underlying this approach, which has been
corroborated in the literature (Alam, 2013), is that it assumes that
a greater variability of nightlights indicates more outages. This is
because places with few outages will exhibit more stable night-
lights, whereas places with high variability likely experience
higher variation.
4.2.4. Interviews
Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview
approach with donors, government officials and IPPs to verify our
assumptions underpinning the estimation strategy, analyse local11 Ideally, we would have the value of total production in each year, but
unfortunately this is not available for the set of studied firms. We therefore rely on
sales as a proxy for production.
9
capacity building and collect primary data not reflected in the data
provided by KfW.5. Results
This part presents the results from our analysis. We first discuss
whether the GET FiT support led to the construction of power
plants that would not have been built without the GET FiT pro-
gramme (Section 5.1).
We then move on to the relationship between firm productivity
and outages in Uganda. We use panel data from the two latest
World Bank Enterprise Survey (2006 & 2013) conducted in Uganda
to estimate the impact of outages on firm productivity, using
pooled OLS and random effects models (Section 5.2). Lastly, we
investigate to what extent the introduction of the GET FiT pro-
gramme is associated with lower outages. As Uganda lacks com-
prehensive outage data (apart from firm-specific World Bank
survey data from 2006 and 2013), we construct our own measures
(as discussed in methods of data), which disaggregated changes in
nightlight variability in Uganda. While this is merely a proxy for
power outages, we shed light on an important and under-
investigated issue (5.2.1).5.1. Financial additionality
Similar to the CDM, we also model the profitability of projects,
namely the Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return
(IRR). Both have become key metrics of investment profitability
analysis since Fisher’s (1907) landmark paper. This approach is
used widely across policy analysis gauging the additionality of sub-
sidies, including the CDM (Chan, 2015).
Firms that applied to receive GET FiT support needed to hand in
extensive financial documentation, which was checked by the pro-
gramme management. The quality (in terms of detail and reliabil-
ity) of this documentation is above that of most other comparable
programmes (Cames, 2016). In addition, instead of using the same
metric of financial viability across different rounds (e.g., 11%), we
use the lowest IRR in each round of projects that were rejected
but then went ahead with construction despite not receiving fund-
ing by the GET FiT programme as the counterfactual.
Out of the 17 projects, 14 were small hydropower plants, so we
focus only on this subset of plants. We do this for two reasons:
First, there was only one bagasse project, and only few applications
in this technology, which limits the ‘counterfactual’ group. Second,
the solar PV projects were auctioned off through a reversed auction
scheme. No solar PV projects were built in the absence of the GET
FiT payments (that covered the difference between the maximum
utility price and the auction price for the auctioned-off capacity).
Hence, for solar PV projects we do not have a counterfactual, but
given that prices in the reverse auction were substantially above
the offered FiT in Uganda, this indicates that all of the solar PV pro-
jects were additional.
Fig. 4 shows the IRR calculations for the small hydropower pro-
jects. Our findings suggest that most small hydropower plants pro-
jects were additional (i.e., would not have been built without the
GET FiT project support). It is evident from the data, that the prof-
itability of projects required to go ahead with construction
declined substantially across the different funding rounds, indicat-
ing lower investment risks. Our detailed investment data shows
that the cost of capital – particularly equity – went down over time
and across the different rounds. The GET FiT programme rightfully
decreased the top-up over the rounds to account for a lower invest-
ment risks in Uganda. Nonetheless, our research indicates that, in
retrospect, the phase out period could even have been shorter.
Fig. 4. Profitability of small hydropower plants in GET FiT programme with counterfactual Internal Rate of Return (IRR). The counterfactual IRR corresponds to the lowest IRR
projects that were rejected but went ahead even without GET FiT support, based on KfW data. Counterfactual IRR was calculated using projects that did not get funding, but
went ahead with the project even without GET FiT funding. This counterfactual data exists as firms needed to hand in detailed financial data to apply for KfW funding. In
addition, these rejected firms were unlikely to change their construction design or other factors later in the process, as environmental and other permits were tied to a specific
design.
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counterfactual rate even with the GET FiT top-up. This indicates
that risk mitigation factors, as discussed before, were critical in
lowering the risk in Uganda for firms that participated in the pro-
gramme as these plants would have been unlikely to have been
built without the programme. Yet, projects in the third round
may have been possible even without the GET FiT top-up as the
financing risk fell rapidly and substanstially between round 1/2
and 3.
However, not only a project-specific perspective should be
taken when evaluating additionality: a sectoral perspective can
complement the project-based one. Companies such as Hydromax,
SAEMS, Tronder and Ecopower were building small run-of-the-
river plants even before the GET FiT programme (Meyer et al.,
2018). In the four years previous to the GET FiT programme,
28 MW of hydropower were built through these companies. How-
ever, none of them was built through the FiT but were all directly
negotiated with the government, given that existing tariffs were
too low. This opaque process likely limited the number of competi-
tors and increased transaction cost for both the government and
project developers. Hence, it is likely that while there might have
been other small run-of-the-river projects, these would likely not
have been built for the cost that the government incurred through
the feed-in tariff (as the international donor community covered
the additional cost).
Our analysis may even underestimate the additionality of the
programme, for two reasons: First, all firms likely benefited from
some aspects of the GET FiT programme, regardless whether they
received funding or not. For instance, the technical training, better
permits, bankable tender documents, and power purchase agree-
ments were not only available to GET FiT participants, but also to10other firms. It therefore strengthened the overall regulatory quality
of the sector and mitigated policy risk. Second, some firms that got
funding may have cross-subsidised unfunded projects. These addi-
tional revenues could have been used to further drive investment
in the power sector in Uganda, or elsewhere in the region.
In terms of risk reductions across the rounds, we find that it pri-
marily translated into lower equity rather than debt cost for pri-
vate developers. While around 70% of debt funding came from
development finance institutions, it is important to note that four
out of 17 projects were financed through private sector loans. Our
detailed investment data also shows that the reduction was driven
primarily through lower expectations of investors on their return
on equity, rather than changes in the price of debt financing or
improvements in the technology (as hydropower is a mature
technology).
5.2. Impact of outages on firm productivity in Uganda
After having discussed, the financial additionality of the GET FiT
plants, we move on to estimations of firm productivity. Our results
show that outages have a significant and negative influence on firm
productivity in Uganda, reducing the sales of firms by around 0.2%
(Table 3). The coefficient of outages is not significant in specifica-
tion 3. This is not surprising, given that many firms might be com-
pensating outages with generators. Indeed, in our sample around
114 out of 368 (specification 5) firms have a generator. For those
that have a generator, it is responsible for 24.9% of the generated
electricity. Of all the 368 firms, it supplies 8.8% of overall electricity
(i.e., also including those firms that do not own a generator).
Hence, firms that have a generator are able to buffer some of these
sales losses through the increased use of a generator, which in turn,
Table 3
Results from pooled panel regression, correcting for heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence.
Pooled Panel Regression Manufacturing (2006 & 2013)
Dep. Variable: log sales (Real 2005 UGX)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Labour (log number employees) 0.817*** (0.06651) 0.852*** (0.070) 0.837*** (0.074) 0.788*** (0.077) 0.806*** (0.076)
Capital (log machinery value) 0.393*** (0.0304) 0.353*** (0.033) 0.337*** (0.035) 0.334*** (0.035) 0.337*** (0.035)
Outages (h per month) 0.0006 (0.0005) 0.0008* (0.0005) 0.002*** (0.0006)
Generator (h per month) 0.001** (0.0006) 0.00006 (0.0008)
Outage_h * Generator_h 0.000008** (0.000003)
Sub-Industry Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 431 431 372 368 368
Adj. R2 0.663 0.6768 0.6864 0.685 0.6893
The dependent variable is log sales in real 2005 UGX. Labour is the log number of employees, capital is the log machinery value of each firm, outages are the hours of outages
per month for a given firm. Generator is the number of hours the generator runs per month, and the interaction between the two continuous variables outages and generator
is how both variables are jointly related to the dependent variable log sales.
Table 4
Results from random effects panel regression.
Random Effects Panel Regression Manufacturing (2006 & 2013)
Observed in Both Periods
Dep. Variable: log sales (Real 2005 UGX)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Labour (log number employees) 0.985*** (0.1233) 0.983*** (0.144) 0.971*** (0.142) 0.915*** (0.147) 0.926*** (0.1457) 0.924*** (0.124)
Capital (log machinery value) 0.313*** (0.063) 0.304*** (0.076) 0.304*** (0.075) 0.312*** (0.075) 0.310*** (0.074) 0.328*** (0.061)
Outages (h per month) 0.0017** (0.0008) 0.002** (0.0009) 0.003** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.0009)
Generator (h per month) 0.009 (0.007) 0.006 (0.011) 0.004 (0.009)
Outage_h * Generator_h 0.00008** (0.00005) 0.00008** (0.00003)
Sub-Industry Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Geographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 134 134 134 134 134 134
Adj. R2 0.680 0.681 0.686 0.689 0.692 0.724
The dependent variable is log sales in real 2005 UGX. Labour is the log number of employees, capital is the log machinery value of each firm, outages are the hours of outages
per month for a given firm. Generator is the number of hours the generator runs per month, and the interaction between the two continuous variables outages and generator
is how both variables are jointly related to the dependent variable log sales.
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ator variable (as a continuous variable – hours of outages per
month), we are able to capture the effect of outages for those firms
that do not have a generator. However, as the generator is most
useful during outages, we introduce an interaction term between
outages and generator, which shows that as outages increase by
an additional hour, another hour of operating a generator increases
sales by 0.0008%. This indicates that firms are able to buffer some
of the sales losses through the generator. The coefficients of the
production function for labour can capital are robust to the inclu-
sion of new variables. While these variables are likely correlated,
we check the extent of correlation in the Supplementary Informa-
tion, and find – via the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) that is still
within acceptable bounds.
We also perform a panel approach to test the robustness of our
results (Table 4). We check with a Hausmann-Test whether a ran-
dom or a fixed-effects model is more appropriate, which indicates
that a random effects model is more suitable. The model shows
that sales are reduced by 0.2–0.3 % with an additional hour of out-
age, which is similar to the previous model (Table 4).
In terms of total cost, we estimate that the impact to businesses
through an average of four hours of outages per day (in our sam-
ple) ranges between 21 and 37% of annual sales (depending on
the specification used – ranging from 0.17% to 0.3% per hour of
outage/month). The mean annual cost of outages per firm in
Uganda range from 454,000 to 801,000 EUR and the median annual
cost of outages ranges from 11,000 to 20,000 EUR (average cost is
higher than median, as some firms in our sample have very high11sales). For firms with generators, the cost of outages is lower, as
they can buffer some of these adverse effects, but still incur addi-
tional investment, fuel and O&M cost for the generator.5.2.1. Changes in outages in Uganda proxied through nightlights
One central question is whether outages in Uganda have been
reduced since the inception of the programme. Clearly, there are
other variables, such as power infrastructure investment unrelated
to the GET FiT, that could confound the effect. However, in the
absence of robust outage data collected by the utility, we use vari-
ations in nightlight to proxy for changes in outages on the ground.
While this measure is not perfect, we are able to provide indicative
evidence of outages in Uganda. As not even the national utility
UETCL has reliable data on the frequency of outages, leveraging
satellite imagery might be a low-cost approach to provide at least
some evidence of outage frequencies in developing countries.
Overall outages seem to be decreasing in Uganda from 2014
onwards (Fig. 5). Due to lacking availability, we unfortunately have
no data from before 2014. The variability in Uganda’s nightlights
decreased from a median standard deviation of 2.4 to 1.8
indicating more stable nightlights – and possibly lower outages.
This represents a decrease in around 23% over the span of five
years. Given that the average firm faces roughly four hours of
outages per day, this could amount to around one hour of fewer
power outages per day, if these gains were distributed equally over
all firms surveyed in the World Bank Enterprise Survey. If we
assume that outages decrease sales by 0.3% per hour of outage
per month, decreasing outages by one hour per day (i.e., 30 per
Fig. 5. Trend in median nightlight standard deviation (which we use as a proxy for outages) for the entire Ugandan territory and for the biggest city in each region based on
VIIRS (2019) nightlight data.
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geographic distribution of the reduction in outages is unequal, as
this mainly happened in the Ugandan capital Kampala.
One possible explanation of these geographical differences
could be that rural areas in Uganda are witnessing ‘land-flight’,
meaning that people move to the bigger cities to seek employment
and better livelihood opportunities. However, the absorptive
capacities differ greatly between cities and is reliant on the quality
of local institutions, housing opportunities, and family ties. It is
likely that Kampala is much better at absorbing people than other
cities, which have fewer financial resources. As people in the city
might try to get access to electricity illegally (through fitting
wires), this may further burden the already strained grid in cities
such as Gulu, Jinja and Mbarara.
In addition, as Kampala hosts the parliament, supreme court
and many international organisations, the political pressure is
greater to provide adequate power services. It also has the best
hospitals in the country, which are reliant on adequate electricity
supply for their equipment and cooling of medication. While many
of them have emergency generators, these are much costlier than
electricity from the grid. In addition, more remote regions may
have lower political leverage to put pressure on politicians in Kam-
pala. Ethnic divisions and regional political alliances may further
exacerbate this divide.
6. Conclusion
For many governments in developing and emerging economies
confronting the dual challenge of increasing power generation
capacity while greening the grid requires attracting private capital.
Well-known limitations of existing schemes to ‘crowd-in’ private
capital in terms of additionality, such as the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), have increased the interest of academics and
policymakers in novel financing mechanisms. Yet, both the practi-
cal experience and academic literature on this topic, particularly in
Sub Saharan Africa, is scant (Lindenberg, 2014; Polzin et al., 2019).
We review and classify existing financing schemes and use rich
project-level data to study the design and outcomes of the GET
FiT financing scheme in Uganda, which aims to jointly improve risk12and return of renewable power investors. This combined risk-
return approach stands in contrast to other approaches, which
either seek to improve return (e.g., CDM) or financial and policy
risk (e.g., MIGA) (Cames, 2016).
Our results indicate that combined risk-return renewable
power support schemes such as the GET FiT programme can pro-
vide effective alternatives to established programmes in terms of
financial additionality and improving investment conditions (and
thereby lowering the required return on investment for investors).
Our results indicate that – in contrast to what the majority of liter-
ature finds on the CDM (Cames, 2016) – that the GET FiT pro-
gramme led to projects that would not have happened otherwise
and hence displayed financial additionality. Our detailed project-
level data indicates that the programme led to fast and tangible
risk reductions in the investment risk in Uganda, attracting roughly
453 million USD in private funding for renewable power genera-
tion for 104 million USD in donor funds (leverage ratio around
1:4.5). While around 70% of debt funding came from development
finance institutions, it is important to note that four out of 17 pro-
jects were financed through private sector loans. Our detailed
investment data also shows that the reduction was driven primar-
ily through lower expectations of investors on their return on
equity, rather than changes in the price of debt financing or
improvements in the technology (as hydropower is a mature tech-
nology). It should be noted, however, that our results are indicative
and should not be interpreted as strictly causal.
Our results also show – using panel data from the World Bank
Enterprise survey – outages are associated with a significant and
sizeable adverse impact on manufacturing performance in Uganda,
of around 0.2–0.3% reduction in sales per additional hour of outage
per month. While firms attempt to offset these negative of unreli-
able electricity generation through generators, this can only partly
offset the adverse impacts of unreliable electricity. As electricity
from generators is more expensive than electricity from the grid,
this increases the overall input cost of the firms.
Nightlights data indicates that outages have decreased by 23%
since the introduction of the GET FiT programme. Naturally, not
all of this is likely through the GET FiT programme, as the utility
UETCL also invested in grid upgrades, and other factors, such as
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is likely that an additional 20% of power generation capacity added
through the GET FiT programme yielded more stable electricity
supply. more stable genelectricity generation. This in turn is likely
to influence firm productivity, specifically in the manufacturing
sector, which consumes the majority of electricity in Uganda
(Mawejje & Mawejje, 2016).
Our study does not address emissions additionality as a high-
resolution power-system model would be required to adequately
study emissions abatement. Similarly, we did not evaluate the cost
that was saved due to the reliance on power from solar, small-
hydro and bagasse instead of heavy-fuel oil generated power,
which is used in Uganda in case of high demand but costs roughly
twice the price that the utility pays on average for power. Another
element of the programme that we did not evaluate are the
impacts on biodiversity and human rights, which should be the
focus of future work.
Our study also underlines that better monitoring of outages in
developing countries is critical: For the GET FiT programme admin-
istration it was commonly challenging to obtain appropriate grid
data, such as voltage variations and load loss at local substations.
As one of the components incentivised grid-upgrades, receiving
this information would have been important to monitor the overall
progress of this particular component. Two approaches may yield
more information in this regard. First, greater technical assistance
from the international donor community. Second, leveraging satel-
lite data and the power of artificial intelligence. Algorithms could
be trained on ground-proved outage data, which is paired with
satellite imagery, to better detect outages through variations in
nightlight.
The GET FiT programme also offers several cautionary – yet
instructive – lessons. First, proper coordination between different
actors in expanding generation capacity is critical. While the GET
FiT programme was introduced, the Ugandan government directly
signed contracts with China’s Exim bank for a large hydropower
project, which will roughly double Uganda’s generation capacity.
This step-change in power supply with slower-than-expected
growth in demand is likely to pose substantial challenges to the
offtaker UETCL. The Ugandan government will then face the chal-
lenge between injecting public money into UETCL to avoid collapse
or let it default on its payments, which will trigger sovereign guar-
antees, which have been given out to all projects since 2012.
Second, power generation investments do not automatically
entail ripple-on effects into distribution, transmission or electrifi-
cation. Merely focusing on expanding generation is not sufficient
given that grid bottlenecks may block the transmission to demand
centres, particularly if these are distributed geographically. The
interconnection component of the GET FiT programme therefore
was seen as critical by interviewees in ensuring the transmission
and distribution of the generated electricity runs smoothly. Future
programmes could attempt to partner with the electrification
agency, which in Uganda is separate from UETCL, to find ways of
coupling the expansion of generation capacity with local electrifi-
cation. On an interesting side note: local communities who saw
the construction of distribution lines, who were themselves not
electrified, protested against the lack of access to power and were
subsequently electrified. Hence, a more decentralised power sys-
tem can also engage citizens to be more vocal about their right
to access power.
Third, cost-reflective power tariffs remain an elusive goal in
many developing countries, including Uganda. While tariffs have
increased during the GET FiT programme, and today are more
reflective of the underlying generation cost, UETCL still remains
heavily reliant financial support from the Ugandan government.
As renewable power is more expensive on a per kWh basis than
large scale hydropower, it is unlikely that the regulatory gains that13have been made will translate into more renewable generation
expansion in the short- to medium term. However, once Uganda
leaves the phase of oversupply (which will likely be partly miti-
gated through exporting power to its neighbours), these regulatory
gains may translate in future renewable power buildout (perhaps
as demand in neighbouring countries increases, interconnection
capacity is increased, industrialising progresses more rapidly and
more people are connected to the grid).
Fourth, financial additionality does not necessarily lead to emis-
sions additionality. The heavy-fuel oil generators have been pro-
viding a substantial amount of electricity in 2017 due to
increased demand from neighbouring countries. Even relatively
small power systems, such as in Uganda, are interconnected with
neighbouring countries. Overall, the envisaged 11 million tonnes
of CO2 that the GET FiT project was expected to abate has now
been corrected downwards. Counterintuitive effects in power sub-
stitution can be observed in many places, such as Europe, where
the German drive towards renewable power has led to greater
exports of its power produced through coal-fired power plants to
neighbouring countries. Similarly, as Uganda introduced more
renewable power, part of its heavy-fuel oil generators have been
used to meet peak demand in neighbouring countries and hence
lead to lower than expected emissions reductions.
Fifth, China is changing the importance of Western develop-
ment cooperation. While Western aid is commonly tied to a num-
ber of stringent environmental, technical and social requirements,
Chinese support does not come with these strings attached. For
many African leaders who need to swiftly act on poverty allevia-
tion this might be advantageous. Yet, for the environment and
marginalised communities the shift towards Chines development
assistance may pose challenges, as can be seen in the displacement
of entire villages for the large hydropower projects in Isimba and
Karuma in central Uganda. Therefore, a greater coordination with
Chinese partners may be warranted.
Overall, the GET FiT programme demonstrates that combined
risk-return schemes can be an effective alternative to programmes
such as the CDM in terms of financial additionality and the
improvement of investment conditions. In many low-income
countries, merely providing price incentives without tackling the
looming sources of financial and policy risk will likely not yield
the expected build-out of renewable power generation. Countries
particularly suited to the GET FiT approach face short-term supply
constraints that can only be bridged through expensive fossil-fuel
based generation (e.g., heavy fuel oil generators in Uganda). As
renewable power projects, such as solar, can be developed quickly
and relatively cheaply, renewable power projects can be an attrac-
tive alternative to conventional generation.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105347.
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